History

History — The Record, With Receipts

monday.com is a founder-run, Israel-based work-software company that has stayed under the same two people since 2012 while its self-description, its growth rate, and its spending posture all changed sharply around them. It was founded in 2012 under the name DaPulse Labs Ltd. [1], launched its product in 2014 [2], and listed on Nasdaq in June 2021. Revenue went from $308.2 million in FY2021 [3] to $1,232.0 million in FY2025 [4] — but annual growth fell every year of that run, from 91% to 27%, and management has guided FY2026 to just 18%–19% [5]. The pages below trace four threads through the primary record: who has run it, what it has called itself, what it promised versus delivered, and how AI moved from a Q and A aside to the headline of the FY2025 annual report.

The two founders who never left

The single most stable fact in monday.com's history is its leadership. Roy Mann has been Co-CEO since the company's founding in 2012; Eran Zinman, the co-founder and former CTO, became Co-CEO in November 2020, just before the IPO [6]. The co-CEO structure was still in place in the FY2025 annual report, which lists both men as "Co-Founder, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Director" [7], and both still delivered prepared remarks on the May-2026 (Q1 FY2026) call. There has been no CEO transition in the company's public life. The longest-serving non-founder executive, CFO Eliran Glazer, joined in March 2021 [8].

Control is also anchored to the founders. Co-CEO Roy Mann holds a single non-economic "founder share" that carries veto rights over mergers, sales of substantially all assets, and changes to the company's social-impact program — language carried unchanged in every annual report through FY2025 [9]. The founders' economic stakes have drifted down with dilution: Mann's beneficial ownership was 4,932,613 shares, about 9.6%, by the FY2025 filing [10]. The business they brought to market was already at scale and growing fast: it raised net proceeds of roughly $591.9 million in the June 2021 IPO [11] on revenue that had grown 91% that year [12].

Sources: co-CEO since 2012/2020 [13]; single-to-multi-product reframing in Q1 FY2022 [14]; founder stake of 4,932,613 shares (9.6%) [15].

What it calls itself keeps moving

The name on the door never changed, but the description of the product did — roughly once every two years. At IPO, monday.com defined itself by a category it claimed to be inventing: "We call our platform 'Work OS', and we believe we are pioneering a new category of software" [16]. The "Work OS" framing held through the FY2022 annual report [17]. By FY2023 the headline self-description had shifted to "a platform that runs the core of all work" [18]. And by FY2025 the opening line had been rewritten again, this time around AI: monday.com "is an artificial intelligence ('AI') work platform that runs and orchestrates the core of all work" [19].

Sources: IPO prospectus [20]; the pioneering “new category of software” framing in the FY2022 20-F [21]; the “runs the core of all work” framing in the FY2023 20-F [22]; the “AI work platform” framing in the FY2025 20-F [23].

The product reality underneath the labels was a deliberate move from one product to several. On the Q1 FY2022 call management said the goal was to "evolve monday.com from a single-product company to a multiple-product company" [24], launching standalone CRM, dev, marketer and projects products. By the FY2025 annual report the suite was four named products plus an AI layer — monday sidekick, monday vibe and monday agents among them [25] — and on the Q3 FY2025 call management said new products "now account for over 10% of total ARR" [26]. The FY2025 risk factors still disclose, however, that "we derive a majority of our revenue from monday work management" [27].

The growth curve and the spend U-turn

The number that defines the arc is the growth rate, and it has fallen every year since the IPO. Revenue compounded from $161 million in FY2020 to $1,232 million in FY2025, but the year-over-year rate stepped down from 91% to 27%, with FY2026 guided to 18%–19% [28].

Source: revenue per FY2021 20-F [29] and revenue of $1,232.0 million in the FY2025 20-F [30]; FY2026 guidance of 18%–19% [31]; FY2020 baseline as reported.

Source: derived from reported revenue ($308.2 million in FY2021 rising to $1,232.0 million in FY2025), 20-Fs [32] [33]; FY2026 figure is the 18%–19% guidance midpoint [34].

Underneath that decelerating top line, the spending story reversed twice. At IPO and through FY2021 management framed the moment as a land grab: "This is the time for us to grab land, to increase our market shares" [35]. Then the 2022 macro slowdown arrived — management acknowledged on the Q2 FY2022 call that it "did see some softness in demand in Europe" [36] — and the framing flipped to "balancing healthy growth in the business while also staying disciplined on improving efficiency and profitability" [37]. That pivot drove a fast margin repair: the FY2022 operating margin of -29% had nearly closed by FY2025, net income turned positive in FY2024, and free-cash-flow margin rose above 25%.

Source: derived from reported financials, FY2022–FY2025 (GAAP operating and net margins; free cash flow as operating cash flow less capex) — as reported.

By the Q4 FY2023 call, with margins at record levels, management told investors it would now stop pushing them higher: "we are not going to improve operating margin in the way we did in the past" [38], choosing to reinvest in the top line. The capital-return chapter opened later: management executed its first-ever share buyback in Q4 FY2025, with $735 million remaining under the authorization after the quarter [39].

Net dollar retention: the metric that came down

Net dollar retention (NDR) is where the change in the business shows up most cleanly. Early in its public life monday.com reported NDR for customers with more than 10 users "over 125%" in Q2 FY2021 [40], rising to "over 135%" by Q4 FY2021 [41]. By FY2025 the company's overall NDR was 110%, 112% and 110% for the most recent three fiscal years [42], and on the Q1 FY2026 call management said it "now expect[s] overall NDR to slightly decline by the end of fiscal year 2026" [43].

Sources: Q4 FY2021 transcript [44]; overall NDR of 110%, 112% and 110% per the FY2025 20-F key metrics [45]; NDR guided to slightly decline in the FY2026 outlook [46].

The expansion that softened was concentrated in seats and in self-serve. On the Q4 FY2025 call management said its no-touch acquisition motion had weakened, noting "returns on those investments have been below historical levels" [47]. The upmarket moved the other way: the company reported 4,281 enterprise customers with more than $50,000 in ARR, within a base of over 250,000 customers, at the end of FY2025 [48]. One leadership change accompanied the upmarket push: the company's chief revenue officer departed, announced on the Q3 FY2024 call [49], and a first C-level global go-to-market hire followed in FY2025.

The targets — set, then unset

monday.com has put concrete multi-year targets on slides twice, and the second set was withdrawn within months. At its December 2023 Investor Day, management committed to generate "$1 billion in free cash flow from 2023-2026" [50]. At its September 2025 Investor Day it set a new FY2027 revenue target of $1.8 billion [51], long-term margin targets of 20%–25% non-GAAP operating margin and 30%+ adjusted FCF margin [52], said it was "ahead of [its] plans to generate over $1B in cash" from FY2023–FY2026 [53], and announced a first-ever share repurchase program of up to $870 million [54]. Then, on the February 2026 (Q4 FY2025) call, management said it "will no longer be discussing our previously provided 2027 targets" and would center its discussion on the 2026 outlook instead [55].

Sources: profitability promise [56]; $1B FCF target [57] and reaffirmation [58]; $1.2B+ ARR [59]; NDR guided to slightly decline [60]; FY2027 target [61] and its withdrawal — no longer discussing those targets [62]; margin targets [63].

AI: from a Q and A aside to the mission statement

AI is the clearest example of a theme that went from absent to central. It first surfaced reactively, in the Q4 FY2022 Q and A, where a co-CEO noted "we've seen such a huge change in such a short time in AI" [64]. One quarter later it was formal strategy: "incorporating AI into our Work OS platform, which we already started implementing" [65]. By the Q4 FY2024 call the company set out a three-part 2025 AI plan built around "AI blocks, product power-ups, and digital workforce" [66] — though the "digital workforce" label itself then disappeared from later calls, replaced by the sidekick / vibe / agents product names that headline the FY2025 annual report [67].

The monetization figure arrived last. On the Q1 FY2026 call management gave its first hard AI revenue datapoint — "approximately 3% of our net new ARR in Q1 was driven by AI" [68] — and announced its first acquisition, an agreement to acquire One AI for native voice agents [69].

Sources: Q4 FY2022 [70]; Q1 FY2023 [71]; Q4 FY2024 [72]; the FY2025 20-F “AI work platform” self-description [73]; Q1 FY2026 AI revenue near 3% of net new ARR [74] and the One AI acquisition [75].

A risk that migrated to the headline: Israel

One risk factor visibly changed in weight over the period. Through FY2022 the company described its Israel exposure in generic terms. The FY2023 annual report added a specific, detailed account beginning "On October 7, 2023, Hamas… infiltrated Israel's southern border," noting that some employees had been called for reserve duty [76]. By FY2025 the disclosure enumerated multiple fronts and addressed the durability of a ceasefire — "certain ceasefire agreements have been reached with Hamas… no assurance this agreement will be upheld" [77]. Over the same span, AI shifted from opportunity to also being a disclosed risk, and the competitive section was rebucketed by use case as the company pushed into CRM and service.

Where the story stands now

On the record, the current chapter reads as follows. Growth has decelerated each year since the IPO and is guided to its slowest pace yet in FY2026 [78]; profitability and cash generation have improved markedly, with FCF margin above 25% and the first buyback executed [79]; the product has broadened from one to several, with new products past 10% of ARR [80]; AI has become the headline framing but is only beginning to monetize, at roughly 3% of net new ARR [81]; and the multi-year FY2027 targets set in late 2025 were withdrawn early in 2026 [82]. Throughout, the same two founders have run the company and one of them retains a veto via the founder share [83] [84].

→ Our read on what this means is in AI Opinions.