Earnings Calls

What the calls are — and what this page does

This page reads every monday.com earnings call the corpus holds — 19 of the company's own quarterly calls, from the first post-IPO call (Q2 FY2021, quarter ended June 30, 2021) through the most recent (Q1 FY2026, quarter ended March 31, 2026) — plus 11 peer calls (Asana, Atlassian, Salesforce, ServiceNow, Microsoft, Freshworks). monday.com's fiscal year is the calendar year. Across the entire window the company has been run by a co-CEO structure: co-founders Roy Mann and Eran Zinman both hold the co-CEO title on every call; Eliran Glazer is CFO; Casey George joined as the company's first global Chief Revenue Officer (announced 2025) after Yoni Osherov stepped down from the CRO role.

Everything below is drawn from the transcripts and the reported financials, and every material statement links to the exact transcript page behind it. Figures are in U.S. dollars, the company's reporting currency. The single most useful thing the multi-quarter corpus gives an investor is the arc — how revenue growth, retention, margins, guidance, and the product story moved call over call — so the page is organized around those threads.

The first call reported revenue of $70.6 million, up 94% year over year [1]; the most recent reported $351 million, up 24% [2]. The 14-quarter span between those two prints is the story.

Revenue: a long, orderly deceleration

Reported quarterly revenue rose every single quarter, but the year-over-year growth rate fell almost monotonically — from the mid-90s percent in 2021 to 24% in the latest quarter. Management stated each print on its call: $162.3 million / +50% in Q1 FY2023 [3], $216.9 million / +34% in Q1 FY2024 [4], $299 million / +27% in Q2 FY2025 [5], $317 million / +26% in Q3 FY2025 [6], $334 million / +25% in Q4 FY2025 [7], and $351 million / +24% in Q1 FY2026 [8].

Source: revenue as stated by management on each call; representative prints cited at [9], [10], [11], [12]; Q4 FY2023 and Q4 FY2024 derived from reported full-year totals.

Source: year-over-year growth as stated by management on each call — same citations as above; latest quarter +24% [13].

Guidance vs. delivered — and the moment the long-range target was withdrawn

For three years the pattern was a beat-and-raise: management would raise the full-year revenue guide by more than the quarter's beat. Initial full-year guides and the delivered outcomes:

Sources: FY2024 guide $926–932M / 27–28% [14]; FY2025 guide $1.208–1.221B / 24–26% [15]; FY2027 $1.8B target reaffirmed [16] then withdrawn [17]; FY2026 initial guide [18] and Q1 raise to $1.466–1.475B / 19–20% [19]; delivered figures as reported.

Two factual inflection points sit inside that table. First, the $1.8 billion FY2027 revenue target set at the December 2023 Investor Day was explicitly reaffirmed on the Q3 FY2025 call — "firmly on track toward our Investor Day revenue target of $1.8 billion for FY 2027" [20] — and then withdrawn one quarter later on the Q4 FY2025 call: "we will no longer be discussing our previously provided 2027 targets" [21]. The CFO framed the reset as prudence — "it would be prudent to reset the guidance that we are giving" — and stated of the self-serve environment, "We didn't see the improvement that we hoped for" [22].

Second, the opening FY2026 guide of 18–19% [23] was raised to 19–20% on the very next call [24], but management paired the raise with the caution that "our guidance does imply some moderation in H2" [25].

Net dollar retention — the rise, the give-back, and the slow bleed

Overall net dollar retention (NDR) is the KPI that moved most. It climbed through 2021–2022 to a stated peak of over 125% (Q1 FY2022), with the over-$50,000-ARR cohort "above 150%" [26]; the over-10-user cohort had "improved to over 135%" the prior quarter [27]. It then rolled over: management said NDR "declined" in Q3 FY2022 [28], citing "slower seat expansion in the upmarket" [29], and "declined in Q2" again in FY2023 [30]. It bottomed near 110%, ticked back up to "111%" in Q3 FY2024 [31] and "112%" in Q4 FY2024 [32] — an improvement management attributed substantially to the 2024 price increase — and has since drifted back to "110% in Q1" FY2026 with a guide to "slightly decline by the end" of FY2026 as the pricing benefit laps [33].

Source: overall NDR as disclosed on each call; 2021–2022 levels were stated as "over" the value shown, and where only a range was given the midpoint is plotted. Peak cohort disclosure [34]; decline [35]; recovery to 112% [36]; latest 110% [37].

The efficiency pivot — and where margins are heading now

The calls record a clean pivot from "invest aggressively" to "efficient growth." The company turned GAAP-profitable in Q1 FY2023 — net income of $7.2 million, "up from a loss of 43.2 million" a year earlier [38] — and posted "record non-GAAP operating margin of 13% and a record free cash flow margin of 34%" by Q3 FY2023 [39], having reached a stated milestone of "more than $5 in ARR for every $1 in cash burned" [40]. Management then signalled the margin-expansion phase was pausing — "we are not going to improve operating margin in the way we did in the past" [41].

The latest guidance points to margin and free-cash-flow give-back: FY2026 free-cash-flow margin is guided to 19–20%, down from a high near 30% [42], and Q1 FY2026 gross margin was "89% compared to 90% in the year ago quarter" with management flagging "additional cost regarding computing costs related to AI" [43].

Source: full-year adjusted free-cash-flow margin as reported; FY2026 is the guided 19–20% midpoint [44].

Source: latest-quarter figures from the Q1 FY2026 call — revenue, growth, NDR and operating margin [45]; adjusted free cash flow [46].

The product and AI narrative, in management's own framing

The story management tells about what the business is has moved in three identifiable phases, each anchored to the calls.

Single product → multi-product Work OS (2021–2023). The Q1 FY2022 call introduced the suite framing — "four new end-to-end products: monday projects, monday dev, monday marketer, and monday sales CRM" [47]. AI first entered the script in Q1 FY2023 as a plan for "incorporating AI into our Work OS platform" [48]. In Q4 FY2023 the company executed its first-ever price increase to the existing base via an "updated pricing model ahead of schedule" [49].

Up-market and multi-product attach (2024). Enterprise scale milestones were reported — a single deployment that "more than tripled once again to reach 80,000 seats" [50] — alongside a governance change: the CRO "will depart the CRO role at the end of December" [51]. Throughout 2024, AI was framed as adoption, not revenue: in Q2 FY2024 management said of AI monetization "we didn't account for this this year" [52]; in Q3 FY2024 they said monetization "might be in 2025, but we can't commit to that" and "we're not modeling for that in the plan for '25" [53]. Q4 FY2024 introduced a "consumption-based pricing model for AI blocks" [54], but the CFO reiterated "We don't have any revenue from AI that we are currently taking into account in fiscal year 2025" [55].

Work management → "work execution" and seats-plus-credits (2025–2026). monday CRM "reached $100 million in annual recurring revenue" [56]; new products passed "over 10% of total ARR" [57]. In Q1 FY2026 the company launched a seats-plus-credits, consumption-based pricing structure described so that "as AI agent takes on more work across organizations, revenue expands naturally without requiring additional seats purchases" [58], and announced an agreement to "acquire One AI" [59]. Multi-product attach in the over-$50,000-ARR cohort reached "34% … adopted more than one product. It was 29% in Q4" [60].

On the size of AI's contribution, the Q1 FY2026 call carried two different figures from two executives: co-CEO Roy Mann stated "Approximately 3% of our net new ARR in Q1 was driven by AI" [61], while CFO Eliran Glazer described "almost 10% of net add ARR coming from the AI product" [62]. Both figures are recorded here as stated.

What was introduced, redefined, or dropped over time

Sources: cohort NDR introduction [63]; first price increase [64]; seats-plus-credits [65]; FY2027 target reaffirmed [66] and withdrawn [67].

Where management turned cautious — the live cycle in their words

The calls log a clear sequence of demand caveats. The first macro reference appeared in Q1 FY2022 — "we are obviously aware of the macroeconomics now and what's happening" [68]. By Q2 FY2022 it was concrete: "we did see some softness in demand in Europe at the end of Q2" [69], with "the sales cycles are taking longer" [70]. The most recent caution is specific and self-serve-centred: in Q2 FY2025 management flagged pressure from Google's search changes on small-business acquisition — "It's just not that material right now. But it's a start of a trend" [71] — and by Q4 FY2025 stated that "the cost to acquire and expand self-serve customers have increased … and the returns on those investments have been below historical levels" [72].

The question analysts pressed hardest in the most recent calls is whether AI agents will erode seat-based revenue. Management's recorded answer in Q1 FY2026: "We have not seen any degradation in demand relative to seats" [73] — stated on the same call as the new pricing model explicitly designed so revenue "expands naturally without requiring additional seats purchases" [74].

Money quotes — management, verbatim

Peer / industry cross-read — does the field say the same thing?

The corpus holds recent calls from six peers. On the themes that matter for a seat-priced work-management vendor, here is what each said, theme by theme, followed by the pattern.

Theme 1 — Will AI agents erode seats? (the central industry question)

This is the one theme where the entire field speaks with one voice: every vendor rejects the seat-erosion thesis — though several simultaneously concede they are building consumption revenue alongside seats. monday.com: "We have not seen any degradation in demand relative to seats" [83]. Atlassian: "we are not seeing any signal of seat compression from customers" [84], backing it with data that customers using AI coding tools "expanded Jira seats 5% faster than those who do not" [85]. Freshworks: "We have not seen seat erosion" [86]. Asana: AI "doesn't reduce that coordination, it multiplies it" [87] — while also admitting its agentic strategy is designed to make "us a lot less dependent on employee count" [88]. Salesforce: "agents augment humans, and they work together side by side" with seat SKUs that "doubled year on year" [89]. ServiceNow: AI spend "is incremental. It is not replacing what they're spending on us" [90].

Theme 2 — Pricing model: seats, consumption, or both?

Pattern: industry consensus on a hybrid model — seats persist, consumption is added on top — but the large-caps are visibly further down the consumption path than monday.com. monday.com is the newest mover, launching seats-plus-credits only in Q1 FY2026 [91]. ServiceNow already books "50% of net new business … from a non-seat-based pricing model" [92] yet still argues an "estimated 1.3 billion seats" of headroom remain [93]. Microsoft says every per-user business "will become a per-user and usage business" [94], with "nearly 60% of our service customers … already purchasing usage-based credits" [95] and 15 million paid Copilot seats reported [96]. Atlassian still defends seats as "a best proxy at the moment for value" [97]; Freshworks monetizes its AI agent on consumption, having "increased our pricing to 50" cents an interaction [98].

Theme 3 — Demand split and retention: where monday.com is an outlier, and where it is not

Pattern: a split on demand, with monday.com squarely on the worse side of one fault line. The clearest negative read-across is Asana — like monday.com a work-management vendor with a large self-serve/SMB base — which reports self-serve "roughly a two-point drag on ARR growth" from search disruption and an over-$100,000 NRR of just 96% [99] [100]. monday.com's own self-serve caution echoes it [101]. On retention monday.com sits in the middle of the pack: Atlassian's NRR is "north of 120%" [102], well above monday.com's 110%, which in turn sits above Asana's 96%. Freshworks frames its own AI/seat exposure as a "share game," positioning itself as "the attacker … taking share with every win" [103].

Sources: AI-vs-seats — MNDY [104], Atlassian [105], ServiceNow [106]; pricing — ServiceNow [107], Microsoft [108]; SMB demand — Asana [109]; retention — Asana [110], Atlassian [111].

→ Our read on what this means is in AI Opinions.